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Voice of Justice: Promoting Fairness Through
Appointed Counsel For Immigrant Children
INTRODUCTION
Indigent immigrant children are one of the most voiceless
groups in the United States today,' many of them locked up silently
in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detention cen-
ters.2 While it is difficult to ignore human rights violations occur-
ring throughout the world, it is even more disturbing to realize that
there is a particularly cruel violation taking place in the United
States today.3 INS officials deprive immigrants in INS detention
centers of the right to a fair hearing and of other basic rights
throughout the United States.4 The INS denial of access to legal
information and representation is producing a discouraging effect
throughout the United States for all detained immigrants, but espe-
I See Letter from Christopher Nugent, Executive Director, Florence Immi-
grant and Refugee Rights Project, to NAPIL Awards Nominations (October 1999)
(on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights) [hereinafter
Letter] ("INS detained people are probably one of the most hidden, neglected,
misunderstood and under-represented groups in our society").
2 See id. ("Since 1996, INS has more than doubled its detained population
to more than 16,000 at any day, nearly 200,000 per year, at a patchwork of more
than 500 sites across the nation including INS detention centers, private contract
facilities, and local prisons and jails. 3.5% of the detained population are children
and 7% are women.").
3 See Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/ins2/
berks98d.htm (depicting the conditions in INS detention centers where immigrant
children are detained and the violations that are inflicted upon the rights of chil-
dren in INS custody).
4 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Seeking Asylum, Some Immigrants Find a Fate
Worse Than Criminal, N.Y. TIMES, January 16, 2000, at Al (describing his interac-
tion with five Chinese women at the Yamhill County jail in Yamhill County, Ore-
gon, who were being detained by the INS for administrative reasons: "For months-
in some cases nearly a year-they had been stuck in jail, not knowing the status of
their cases or what would happen to them, not able to ask questions or seek help.
According to inmates and jail officials, when two of the Chinese women were or-
dered to switch bunks and did not understand, guards knocked them to the ground
and handcuffed them, bloodying one ... [they] arrived at Portland International
Airport and requested asylum. Instead of finding freedom, they were hustled into
different jails. Although they had broken no law, they were often treated worse
than criminals ... [s]till, the women's fundamental concern was not so much their
daily treatment as the way they had been locked up without the right to make their
case effectively or without any knowledge of what was happening to them.").
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cially compelling is the fate of detained immigrant children who are
particularly vulnerable.5
Children in deportation hearings are entitled by statute to
counsel, but this right is provided at no expense to the government.6
As a result of regulatory restrictions by INS prohibiting the ap-
pointment of counsel for immigrants detained in INS custody, im-
migrant children are in dire straits.7 Children are especially
vulnerable because they are more susceptible to rights violations.8
This vulnerability is manifest throughout INS detention centers,
where children face daily rights violations due to their inability to
express themselves. This inability precludes immigrant children
from enjoying their right to a fair hearing.9 Immigrant children fac-
ing deportation remain voiceless, while the INS ignores its own reg-
ulations, including those requiring decent conditions in INS
detention and access to legal information. 10
5 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS 27 (1997)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH] ("Although children in INS detention have
a clear right to be provided with adequate legal information and to be represented
effectively by counsel of their own choosing, we were informed by numerous pub-
lic interest lawyers and by an immigration judge that the majority of children re-
ceive minimal legal information and are unrepresented. Our interviews with
children confirmed these reports").
6 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 292, 8 U.S.C. 1229 (Supp. 2000)
(delineating this right and highlighting the limitation on government funding from
providing counsel for immigrants). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
5, at 19 ("In general, deportable aliens are entitled to counsel of their own choos-
ing and at their own expense.").
7 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 ("The lack of adequate infor-
mation and representation makes a mockery of due process protections and leaves
hundreds of children languishing for months in sub-standard detention conditions,
bewildered and afraid, while their cases move slowly through the immigration
courts.").
8 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 18 ("INS regula-
tions. . .accord with the general judicial recognition that children are unusually
vulnerable, and may be unable to understand fully the ramifications of their legal
situation without adult assistance.").
9 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,.supra note 5, at 55-56 ("Children in INS
detention are systematically denied rights that are fundamental under interna-
tional agreements and under the U.S. Constitution and statutory law: they are de-
nied due process, denied access to legal representation, denied humane living
conditions, denied personal privacy, and denied meaningful opportunities to un-
derstand what is happening to them and why. If they wish to remain in the United
States, they must/negotiate their way through a maze of technical and bewilder-
ingly complex legal procedures, all in a language and setting utterly foreign to
them.").
10 See supra note 5.
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This note focuses on the right of indigent immigrant children
facing deportation proceedings to counsel at the government's ex-
pense. Part I examines how the government's traditional classifica-
tion of immigration proceedings impedes immigrant children from
enjoying their recognized rights. Although immigrants are entitled
to due process under the Fifth Amendment, because immigration
proceedings are classified as civil matters, individuals in INS deten-
tion do not have a sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel.1
Part II suggests that the extension of appointed counsel for children
in INS detention is implicit in their already recognized right to due
process.12 Immigrants already have a qualified right to counsel
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.13 Part II explores the
source of this fundamental right and what it means for those de-
tained in INS custody. Part III examines the urgency of this right
for children, especially immigrant children, because of their inher-
ent vulnerability. Although courts have not yet ordered appointed
counsel in deportation proceedings, courts do recognize that ap-
pointed counsel may be necessary in extreme situations. 14 Part III
confirms that there needs to be a per se rule mandating appointed
counsel for children facing deportation. This rule would make ap-
pointed counsel mandatory for indigent children in INS detention.
Finally, Part IV concludes that the assertion of this right would
serve to further the government's interests, as well as the interests
of immigrant children. The government stands to benefit enor-
mously from the adoption of appointed counsel for immigrant chil-
dren, where this program would produce a more efficient
administrative process for immigration hearings and would expe-
dite the outcomes for many of those detained.' 5
11 See Letter, supra note 1 ("Their [referring to INS detainees] detention is
'civil' for administrative, adversarial removal proceedings before the Immigration
Court with the government represented by the INS versus usually an indigent re-
spondent with limited education and proficiency in English.").
12 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (holding aliens are entitled to
procedural due process).
13 See supra note 6.
14 See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
15 See discussion infra Part IV.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS AND ITS EFFECT ON CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
Immigration proceedings have traditionally been categorized
as civil matters. 16 The characterization of deportation proceedings
in this way enables the government to subtly violate the rights of
indigent children in INS detention.17 Because civil proceedings do
not guarantee the same procedural safeguards that criminal pro-
ceedings do, many children in detention slip through the cracks, un-
represented by counsel.' 8 Courts have routinely denied the right to
government-funded attorneys in various civil contexts including de-
portation hearings. 19 This extension of civil classification towards
deportation hearings qualifies the government's denial of funds
from detained immigrant children who need to obtain counsel.20
INS procedures for handling immigrant children in detention only
serves to further deprive these children of their right to counsel. 21
16 See Nwabueze v. INS, 976 F.2 d 737, 744 (1992) ("[I]mmigration proceed-
ings are civil"); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) ("A deporta-
tion proceeding is a purely civil action... ").
17 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 ("The lack of trained immigra-
tion lawyers able to accept indigent clients is one reason so many children are
unrepresented, but the INS also bears a substantial portion of the blame for de-
taining the children in conditions which make it overwhelmingly difficult for the
children to have access to meaningful legal representation.").
18 See Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Detention, Due
Process, and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 159, 159 (1990) ("Because immi-
gration procedures such as deportation are considered civil rather than criminal,
these alien children receive little due process"). See also Magallanes-Damian, 783
F. 2d 931, 933 (1986) ("Deportation proceedings are deemed to be civil, not crimi-
nal, proceedings and thus not subject to the full panoply of procedural safeguards
accompanying criminal trials.").
19 See e.g Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (declaring that counsel
does not have to be provided in civil hearings determining termination of public
assistance benefits); Glover v. Johnson, 75 F. 3d 264, 265 (holding state is not
required to provide legal assistance to inmates in connection with custody
matters).
20 See Michael A. Olivas, "Breaking The Law" On Principle: An Essay on
Lawyers' Dilemnas, Unpopular Causes, And Legal Regimes, 52 U. PiTr. L. REV.
815, 824, 831 (1991) ("As a result of the remote locations of the facilities [where
individuals in INS custody are held], INS policies on transfer and availability of
legal resources, and poor response by organized bars, legal assistance to unaccom-
panied children is virtually non-existent .... There are virtually no legal services
in the rural locations, and the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) program is statu-
torily prohibited from serving these aliens.").
21 21 See id. at 825 (discussing the INS practices of not providing adequate
lists of legal services to children in INS custody and transferring children to rural
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While deportation proceedings are technically defined as civil in na-
ture, "[i]n a significant number of immigration cases, the conse-
quences of deportation seem as 'grievous' as the loss of liberty that
comes with physical confinement. '22
The conditions in INS detention and the harsh consequence
these children face if deported dictate the need for procedural safe-
guards to ensure that their rights are not violated.23 The INS has
increased its detention facilities across the country, and especially in
the Southwest, under the guise of protecting U.S. borders.24 At one
time, this increase in facilities led to housing some children under
inhumane conditions including a former Department of Agriculture
pesticide storage facility in Texas.25
Many children in INS detention have been abused by wars in
their own countries and often a dangerous trip to the United States
furthers their trauma. Even those housed in more humane condi-
tions may be denied access to basic rights.26 The denial of these
rights increases the need for counsel.27 It is paramount that chil-
dren facing the possibility of deportation receive legal assistance,
regardless of whether or not they are able to meet the financial
costs of having an attorney.28 The lack of access to attorneys, or
detention centers, where attorneys will have difficulty contacting them. "In several
instances, transfers have even been made after counsel was retained or as a blatant
attempt to deny counsel.").
22 Margaret H. Taylor, Symposium: Promoting Legal Representation for De-
tained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REv 1647, 1663
(1997).
23 See David A. Robertson, An Opportunity To Be Heard: The Right To
Counsel In A Deportation Hearing, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 1019, 1022 (1988) ("Deporta-
tion is harsh; its consequences parallel punishment for a crime"). See also Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (describing deportation as an extreme depri-
vation of liberty because of the potential to lose property, life, or "all that makes
life worth living").
24 See Olivas, supra note 18, at 160 (listing the detention sites throughout the
United States, holding over 2000 immigrant children in 1990).
25 See id. at 160 ("[T]he facilities are squalid: one site in Texas has been
sardonically dubbed "El Corralon" (The Corral), while another is a former De-
partment of Agriculture pesticide storage facility. Aliens are fenced into shacks,
tents, and makeshift shelters which are more dangerous and less habitable than
those that detained Japanese Americans during World War II").
26 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 (reporting the denial of right to
legal information and representation from detained children in one INS facility, as
evidence of violations to which children detained by the INS are subject).
27 See id.
28 See id.
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even telephones to plan for their immigration cases results in a de-
nial of due process. 29 These conditions are particularly traumatic
for immigrant children who typically are unaccompanied by adults
in detention and who are unaware of their legal rights in a foreign
environment. 30 "In all, the situation is grave for these alien chil-
dren, who face either extended detention in this country, or return
to their own, often war-plagued, countries. ' '31
Reno v. Flores sets forth the rights of immigrant children. 32 In
Flores, a class of detained minors brought a class action, contesting
an INS regulation stipulating strict guidelines for the release of mi-
nors from INS custody to only certain relatives and condemning the
conditions in which some minors were held.33 Having determined
that the conditions in which immigrant minors were held did not
warrant the need to release the children into the custody of family
members, the Court justified the detention program as a necessary
precaution in protecting the welfare of juveniles.34 The conditions
to which these children are subject however, suggests otherwise. 35
"One of the most troubling things about the facilities in which the
29 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 (describing the difficulty INS
detained children face due to limited access to help outside of the detention cen-
ters: "The children we interviewed spoke constantly of the difficulty in contacting
anyone by telephone. Children reported that they were not permitted to receive
incoming calls from family members outside the United States, and many children
were upset at their inability to contact adult family members held by the INS at the
adult detention center in Florence, Arizona-since neither facility will accept collect
calls, the children have no way of calling relatives or receiving calls from them.
Children routinely must ask for permission to use the telephone, and permission is
routinely and arbitrarily refused.").
30 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 ("The children's inability to
receive incoming calls reliably, combined with the difficulty in telephoning rela-
tives outside the country or in INS detention centers elsewhere, the restrictions on
telephone usage, and the absence of fully private interview areas for meetings with
attorneys, severely interfere with the children's right to contact their legal repre-
sentatives, to obtain information relevant to their status, and to consult with adult
family members.").
31 See Olivas, supra note 18, at 160.
32 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 292.
33 See id. at 294, 301.
34 See id. at 312, 314 (holding INS procedures compatible with due process
for immigrant minors).
35 See Lisa Rodriguez Navarro, Comment, An Analysis Of Treatment Of Un-
accompanied Immigrant And Refugee Children In Ins Detention And Other Forms
Of Institutionalized Custody, 19 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 589, 607 (1998) (compar-
ing the violence in some of the facilities in which immigrant children are detained
to that of an adult prison).
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children were held is that they were essentially prisons, which is not
an appropriate setting for children who are being held for adminis-
trative reasons only."'36 Because the facilities where INS detains
immigrant children resemble prisons, the children are often treated
as prisoners, and not as administrative detainees. 37 Even though
Flores tries to justify INS detention by distinguishing it from prison
settings,38 investigations of these detention centers evidence that
there is little disparity between the two types of environments. 39
One investigation of a Los Angeles detention facility revealed that
the interests of children, meant to be protected by "legal custody,"
are actually adversely affected, as a result of being detained by
INS:40
The children were confined to the premises, and in Los
Angeles County they were behind fences, barbed wire,
and locked doors, with guards all around. The children
were living in rooms with cinder-block walls and metal
cots, and they were not allowed any personal posses-
sions. These children were confined to a very small
area, and had no freedom at all . . . . They had no
personal privacy .... [T]here were toilets and showers
right in the bedrooms, and neither the showers nor the
toilets had doors. If a child wanted to take a shower or
use the toilet, it had to be done in front of all the other
children. 41
The conditions in INS detention reinforce the need for ap-
pointed counsel for indigent children facing deportation. These
conditions foster the violations of children's rights by inhibiting
36 Rosa Ehrenreich, Addresses: Unaccompanied Children In LN.S. Deten-
tion, 5 GEO J. FIGHTING POVERTY 279, 281 (1998).
37 See id. at 281 (describing how INS in the Los Angeles detention centers
requires that detained children wear detention uniforms and follows a practice of
handcuffing children when they are being transferred to their [civil] deportation
hearings).
38 See supra text accompanying note 52.
39 See supra text accompanying note 35.
40 See Ehrenreich, supra note 36, at 281 (reporting the findings of her inves-
tigations of children's living conditions in INS-detention centers, including the Los
Angeles investigation).
41 Ehrenreich, supra note 36, at 281.
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children's access to representatives and to legal information. 42
Human Rights Watch, an organization dedicated to protecting the
rights of people around the world, responded to concerns from vari-
ous organizations regarding children in INS detention by investigat-
ing the conditions of these detained children in Arizona, California
and Pennsylvania. 43 Human Rights Watch reported the results of
one of the Pennsylvania investigations, in Leesport, Pennsylvania. 44
In its investigation, Human Rights Watch conducted interviews
with the children detained at the facility in Pennsylvania and later
reported their findings regarding the facility firsthand, from the
children. 45 Human Rights Watch related that INS typically seizes
thousands of unaccompanied children a year.46
While many of the children immediately accept removal rather
than face deportation proceedings, INS detains the rest until they
42 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 32 ("If children in INS de-
tention find it difficult to locate attorneys and family members, attorneys find it
equally difficult to locate current and prospective clients. The INS routinely trans-
fers children from detention facility to detention facility, rarely giving the children,
their families or their lawyers notice of the transfers.").
43 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 3 (discussing the results of the inves-
tigations in Arizona and California. "The report detailed numerous violations of
children's rights, in breach of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. statutory provisions, INS
regulations, the terms of court orders binding on the INS, and international law.
We [Human Rights Watch] found that with regard to unaccompanied children, the
INS has an inherent and troubling conflict of interest: children are arrested, impris-
oned, and frequently removed by the same agency that is charged with caring for
them and protecting their legal rights. Additionally, we found that too many chil-
dren were detained in jail-like conditions for long periods of time and that the INS
failed to inform children of their legal rights, interfered with their efforts to obtain
legal representation, and failed to facilitate contact with their family members").
44 See id. (describing the investigation at the Berks County Youth Center in
Pennsylvania, which included a series of interviews with children, their attorneys,
and their immigration advocates, between June and November 1998).
45 See id. (reporting the following conditions: "Nationwide, as many as one-
third of children in INS detention are placed in secure detention centers for juve-
nile offenders. Often held with youth detained for committing violent crimes, they
are denied personal possessions and held in a severely restrictive, punitive environ-
ment. Children interviewed for this report were handcuffed during transport, strip
searched, and subjected to other degrading treatment. We found that too often,
children in INS custody do not receive adequate legal information or representa-
tion and are transferred without the knowledge of their attorneys or families.
Many children are denied information about their detention or education in a lan-
guage that they understand and may be confined for months at a time without
direct access to a single person with whom they can converse in their own
language.").
46 See id.
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are brought in front of the immigration judge. 47 These children sel-
dom are able to comprehend what is happening to them or why
they are being confined and deprived of basic human rights.4 The
presence of an attorney, even at the time of arrest, would alleviate a
great deal of this confusion because an attorney could provide the
child with enough information to make some informed decisions
about his or her case, rather than accept immediate removal. 49
Human Rights Watch depicts the narrative of one such child de-
tained by INS:
For six months, Xiao Ling lived in a small concrete cell,
completely bare except for bedding and a Bible in a
language she could not read. Locked up in prison-like
conditions with juveniles accused of murder, rape, and
drug trafficking, Xiao Ling told Human Rights Watch
in June 1998 that she was kept under constant supervi-
sion, not allowed to speak her own language, told not
to laugh, and even forced to ask permission to scratch
her nose. Bewildered, miserable, and unable to com-
municate with anyone around her, she cried everyday.
Only fifteen years old at the time of her detention,
Xiao Ling was never charged with any crime.50
This narrative, typical of the conditions to which many de-
tained children are subject, reinforces the crucial need for these
children to have attorneys actively working on their release from
detention.51 Despite the findings of investigations, like the one con-
ducted by Human Rights Watch, courts continue to turn their backs
on these children and abandon their basic rights by denying that
detention is anything short of "legal custody," meant to protect the
rights of these children. 52
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See Ross, infra note 62, at 1618 ("The child who has been represented by a
lawyer who has heard and communicated the child's views may cooperate more
fully with the court's decree, and render the decree more effective.").
50 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 3.
51 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 ("[The U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) violates the] rights of hundreds of unaccompanied
children each year, some as young as eight, contrary to international law as well as
INS regulations and policies.").
52 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 298 (quoting Juvenile Care Agreement
176a) ("'Legal Custody' rather than 'detention' more accurately describes the real-
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The INS typically apprehends an immigrant when it recognizes
that the immigrant is "removable. ' 53 Despite this classification of
an immigrant as removable, many of those apprehended have a le-
gal remedy to remain in the United States.54 Unfortunately, the
existence of these remedies does not ensure that an immigrant child
will be awarded the relief for which he or she may qualify because
of the difficulty posed for children without attorneys.55 Immigra-
tion law is increasingly complex, hindering immigrants in detention,
especially children, from asserting, much less succeeding on their
claims.56 "The evaluation of these possible [forms of relief], the ap-
plication process for each, and the level of documentation required
to prevail are daunting for most adults. A child would find these
options bewildering and virtually incomprehensible without the as-
sistance of counsel." 57
Other factors including language barriers, fear or intimidation,
and a lack of knowledge about the legal process provide formidable
hurdles for a child, attempting to argue his or her own deporta-
tion.58 Immigrant children that face these barriers do not stand a
chance in succeeding in their pleas for relief because of the diffi-
culty of making such a plea. "With only a small degree of hyper-
bole, the immigration laws have been termed 'second only to the
ity of this arrangement, however, since these are not correctional institutions but
facilities that meet 'state licensing requirements for the provision of shelter care,
foster care, group care, and related services to dependent children,' . . . and are
operated 'in an open type of setting without a need for extraordinary security
measures").
53 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240 (e) (2) ("[tlhe term 'remova-
ble' means - 1) (A) in the case of an alien not admitted to the United States, that
the alien is inadmissible under section 212, or (B) in the case of an alien admitted
to the United States, that the alien is deportable under section 237").
54 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240 (A) (b) (3), § 240A (e), § 208
(d) (1) (enumerating some of the forms of relief).
55 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 ("The lack of effective legal
representation means that many children who might be eligible for release remain
for months in detention, while others are deported back to countries in which they
may face political persecution. Denial of such crucial rights would be disastrous
for any group, but it is particularly disastrous for children, who are at a uniquely
vulnerable stage of their lives.").
56 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1650.
57 Human Rights Watch, supra note 3, (considering the legal standards for
recommendations regarding children in INS detention).
58 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1650 (emphasizing the obstacles incurred by
immigrant respondents trying to represent themselves).
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Internal Revenue Code in complexity.' 59 A lawyer is often the only
person who could thread [through] the labyrinth [of complex immi-
gration law.]" 60
Although the complexity of immigration law alone conveys the
desperate situation that immigrant children are faced with, even
more frustrating is the image of children fighting against deporta-
tion, pro se.61 The INS should not leave these substantial legal in-
terests to be argued by immigrant children who stand to be
deported if they lose their immigration cases. Permitting lay people
to argue their own legal claims is irrational, especially in deporta-
tion hearings, where the stakes are high.62 Given the complexity of
immigration law, it is even more unconscionable to allow children
to argue pro se because of their inherent vulnerability, further
strengthening the notion that immigrant children should have ap-
pointed counsel. 63
The INS itself provides substantial obstacles for immigrant
children trying to assert their claims. The Service is reluctant to
ensure that children have "real" access to attorneys.64 The INS lim-
its children's opportunities to be informed of their rights by creating
obstacles such as regularly transferring detained children. 65 The
59 E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 107 (1985).
60 Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847, F. 2d 1307, 1312 (1987).
61 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1685 ("In short, litigation is a tool for law-
yers, which is seldom wielded successfully by unrepresented individuals. When
detainees are denied access to legal counsel, they are effectively cut off from the
very process that is supposed to protect their rights.").
62 See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability To Voice: Appointing Counsel
For Children In Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1600 (1996) (discuss-
ing the rationale for prohibiting non-lawyers from representing themselves and
others in their cases).
63 See id. at 1600 ("The underlying assessment of the relationship of lay
adults to the legal system common to discouraging pro se litigation and forbidding
unlicensed representation lends further support to appointing counsel for
minors.").
64 See Ehrenreich, supra note 36, at 283 (describing the INS practice of pro-
viding children with lists of legal providers in languages they did not understand).
65 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5 ("If children in INS detention
find it difficult to locate attorneys and family members, attorneys find it equally
difficult to locate current and prospective clients. The INS routinely transfers chil-
dren from detention facility to detention facility, rarely giving the children, their
families or their lawyers notice of the transfers.").
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consequence of this limitation enables courts to bypass the rights of
these children to legal remedies altogether. 66
II. APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
Is INTEGRAL TO A CHILD'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A FAIR
HEARING AND DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
Having denied children legal entitlement to government-
funded counsel, the government deprives immigrant children the
fairness and dignity that due process protection extends to them.67
While injustice alone does not safeguard the rights of these chil-
dren, the predicament in which the government leaves these chil-
dren is not just unfair, it is a denial of their right to due process.68
The government has already established a statutory right to counsel
for immigrants in detention. 69 Because this right is asserted at no
66 See Ehrenreich, supra note 36, at 283 ("[R]ecent restrictions placed by
Congress on federally-funded legal services providers now make it illegal for such
providers to represent undocumented aliens. As a result, the pool of attorneys
who can represent indigent detained children... has shrunk from small to virtually
non-existent... All of this leads to a situation in which very few detained children
are represented by attorneys. Given the extreme complexity of immigration pro-
ceedings, this means that, in practice, even those children with valid reasons to stay
in the United States (asylum claims, relatives living here legally) end up being
removed.").
67 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 56 ("The lack of effective
legal representation means that many children who might be eligible for release
remain for months in detention, while others are deported back to countries in
which they may face political persecution. Denial of such rights would be disas-
trous for any group, but it is particularly disastrous for children, who are at a
uniquely vulnerable stage of their lives. The denial of these fundamental rights is
particularly shameful in a country like the United States, which prides itself on its
respect for international human rights norms. And the blame for this situation
falls squarely on the U.S. government, and in particular on the INS, which has
demonstrated incompetence, neglect and bad faith in addressing the needs and
rights of detained children.").
68 See id. at 64 ("[C]hildren going through deportation or exclusion hearings
as a result of INS apprehension also need legal assistance, since their young age,
the complexity of immigration proceedings, and their frequent lack of English
skills makes it almost impossible for them to obtain a fair hearing without the help
of an attorney.").
69 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 292 ("In any removal proceedings
before an immigration judge and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney
General from any such removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel,
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.").
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expense to the government,70 there is little chance that indigent
children will be represented, since most cannot afford to hire their
own attorneys.71
The right to appointed counsel for indigent immigrant children
is implicit in the explicitly recognized right of due process protec-
tion. The due process clause of the Constitution assures that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."' 72 Courts have recognized that due process protec-
tion extends to immigrants 73 who are encompassed in the definition
of those protected under the due process clause.74 "Aliens must be
afforded due process protection during [the] deportation pro-
cess."' 75 The right to appointed counsel for immigrant children
stems from this already recognized right to due process for immi-
70 See id.
71 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1650 (indicating that the government further
limits the chance that immigrant children will be represented by placing harsh re-
strictions on attorneys willing to help). See also Letter, supra note 1 ("While the
right to counsel is cherished in our legal system as a fundamental tenet of due
process, this right remains hollow to people in immigration removal proceedings
who cannot afford or access counsel. Consider, for example, that 90% of INS de-
tained people go unrepresented before the Immigration Court due to their poverty
coupled with remote locations of detention sites and shortage of pro bono
resources.").
72 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73 It is important to note here that any references to immigrants, aliens or
detained individuals incorporate only those characterized as excludable and not
inadmissible. The arguments set forth throughout this article encompass only the
rights of those already admitted into the U.S. The rights of those characterized as
inadmissible are outside the scope of this article and will not be discussed and are
not included in the discussion of entitlement to due process.
74 See, e.g., Shaugnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("It is true
that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encom-
passed in due process of law.").
75 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) ("[I]t is not competent for
the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer ... arbitrarily to cause an
alien who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its
jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be
taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard
upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No
such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law
are recognized."). See also Agulera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F. 2d 565, 568 (1975)
(holding that an alien cannot be deported from the US without a "fair opportunity
to be heard").
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grants because children deportation hearings stand to lose their lib-
erty, if deported. 76
The qualification of due process protection and entitlement to
a fair hearing by immigrants further suggests that immigrant chil-
dren should have a right to appointed counsel in their deportation
hearings. 77 Due process requires fair process and procedure when
individuals face significant deprivations. The interests of children
facing deportation are significant. "'[D]ue process, unlike some le-
gal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unre-
lated to time, place and circumstances ... [d]ue process is flexible
and calls for such protection as the particular situation demands. ' 78
Mathews v. Eldridge summarizes a balancing test to ascertain the
requirements necessary to satisfy procedural due process.79 The
Court in Mathews concluded that three components should be
balanced:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirements, would entail.80
76 See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S 590 (1953) (recognizing that due
process of law must be provided before an alien is deported because deportation
involves a loss of liberty). See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50
(1950) ("When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one
before a tribunal which meets even currently prevailing standards of impartiality.
A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in
the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life
itself. It might be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional standards of
impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of which has
been condemned by Congress as unfair even where less vital matters of property
rights are at stake.").
77 See Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525.F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that
an alien's right to counsel is so fundamental that lack of adequate time to obtain
counsel amounted to a deprivation of due process).
78 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 335.
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All deprivations of life, liberty or property require fair process.8'
Deploying a balancing test, Mathews sets out what process is due.
Due process should be measured by considering the standard for
fair procedures and an opportunity to respond. For children who
face deportation hearings without counsel, they neither are pro-
vided with fair procedure nor an opportunity to respond. The pri-
vate interest encompassed for children facing deportation is the
interest in having an opportunity to present their claims against de-
portation. This interest is not met for those who do not have coun-
sel present. Children have a strong interest in having counsel
present to articulate their legal claims for relief, where they face
grave consequences if ordered deported. 82
The right of children to be heard is little more than a theoreti-
cal right, when a child does not have a representative to voice his
thoughts and plead his case.83 "Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law ....
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him."84 The recognition of this handicap of lay people in attempt-
ing to make legal arguments supports the notion that a child is se-
verely prejudiced without counsel.8 5 Where courts recognize that
lay people need to have their hands held by attorneys to get
through their legal cases, Congress should recognize that children
have an especially compelling need for guidance. Regardless of a
child's intelligence or maturity, the complexity of immigration law
precludes effective pro se representation by children arguing
against their own deportation. 86
Having sanctioned the denial of appointed counsel for immi-
grant children, the government denies these children of their basic
81 See id.
82 See discussion supra Part I.
83 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 64 ("Unlike adults, unac-
companied children cannot simply be left to fend for themselves while their immi-
gration status is being adjudicated. Both United States law and international
standards reflect an awareness that children require special protection and care.").
84 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 69 (1932).
85 See id. at 69 (suggesting that if we accept as true the notion that educated
an d intelligent people without any legal knowledge are prejudiced if denied coun-
sel, we are even more compelled to accept that this prejudice severely effect "the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect").
86 See infra note 163.
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right to be heard. Given the procedures currently governing the
rights of children facing deportation, the risk for an erroneous dep-
rivation of a child's right to be heard is high. The value of addi-
tional safeguards to protect against such deprivations is immense,
ensuring that those entitled to due process receive it. Without the
presence of attorneys at children's deportation hearings, it is almost
certain that the rights of these children will not be adequately
represented.
Courts have laid out a broad test, applicable on a case by case
basis, to determine when appointment of counsel may be re-
quired.87 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court considered the appoint-
ment of counsel to indigents when such counsel is necessary to
render "fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process. '88
The Court recognized that indigent adults, even in a civil proceed-
ing such as a probation revocation hearing, may require appointed
counsel to adhere to due process. 89
Having recognized that compliance with due process may re-
quire the appointment of counsel in extreme situations, it should
also be recognized that the position of indigent children facing de-
portation qualifies as extreme. 90 Adhering to due process in such
extreme situations can only be met with the appointment of coun-
sel, to ensure indigent children the fair hearings to which they are
entitled. 91 "Where an un-represented indigent alien would require
counsel to present his position adequately to an immigration judge,
he must be provided with a lawyer at the Government's expense.
Otherwise, 'fundamental fairness' would be violated. '92 The lack of
counsel in children's immigration proceedings is so prejudicial to an
87 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) ("It is neither possible
nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be
followed in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the
applicable due process requirements.").
88 Id. at 790.
89 Id. at 790 ("[T]here will remain certain cases in which fundamental fair-
ness - the touchstone of due process - will require that State provide at its ex-
pense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.").
90 See infra. note 142.
91 See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F. 2d 565, 571-572 (1975) (DeMascio,
J., dissenting) ("[A] resident alien has an unqualified right to the appointment of
counsel ... Expulsion is such a lasting punishment that meaningful due process can
require no less.").
92 Id. at 568.
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immigrant facing deportation that it may constitute a violation of
due process.93
For children, the right to appointed counsel is integral to the
right to a fair hearing. 94 "In our adversarial system of justice, the
right to be heard is normally equated with the right to be heard
through counsel who can navigate a complex judicial process. The
importance of counsel to children cannot be overestimated." 95
Logic dictates that few situations could be more extreme than the
ones indigent immigrant children find themselves in when held in
INS custody facing deportation, without a voice. This recognition
that providing indigent adults with appointed counsel may be inevi-
table in comporting with due process only further emphasizes the
indispensability of such provisions for children who are inherently
more vulnerable.
Courts have validated the notion that an immigrant's right to
be heard should be protected by recognizing that immigrants are
entitled to genuine opportunities to obtain counsel of their choice. 96
Recognition of an immigrant's right to due process has even
stretched as far as statements by courts reserving the right to ap-
point counsel to indigent immigrants in certain cases. 97 In Escobar
93 See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F. 2d at 573 (contending that the absence
of counsel at the petitioner's deportation proceeding "inherently denied him fun-
damental fairness").
94 See Ross, supra note 62, at 1578.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g,. Rios-Berrios, 776 F. 2d at 859 (holding the immigration judge did
not give alien fair opportunity to obtain counsel when alien only had two working
days); Casteneda-Delgado 525 F. 2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding a refusal to
grant alien second continuance to find attorney amounted to violation of fifth
amendment due process right); Castro-O'Ryan, 821 F. 2d at 1420 (holding refusal
by immigration judge to grant a change of venue request by alien deprived alien of
opportunity to obtain counsel).
97 See Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F. 2d at 568 n.3 (conveying that an indigent
alien may have a right to appointed counsel, where his right to fundamental fair-
ness may be jeopardized); Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 787 F. 2d 1294, 1297 n.3 (1986)
("We note that Congress' treatment of indigent aliens in s 292 [referring to the
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, entitling aliens to counsel of
their choice] may not be constitutional as applied in individual cases. The Fifth
Amendment guarantee of due process applies to immigration proceedings, and in
specific proceedings, due process could be held to require than an indigent alien be
provided with counsel despite the prohibition of section 292"); Magallanes-
Damian 783 F. 2d at 933 (suggesting that a petitioner in a deportation proceeding
may have to be provided counsel, where they receive ineffective assistance, violat-
ing their Fifth Amendment right to fundamental fairness through due process).
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Ruiz v. INS, the court noted that even the restriction in the statu-
tory provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that prevents
the government from appointing counsel to immigrants in deporta-
tion proceedings may be inapplicable in certain compelling cases
because "the guarantee of due process applies to immigration pro-
ceedings." 98 In Magallanes-Damian v. INS, the court addressed
such a claim, where a group of immigrants challenged their depor-
tation orders, contending that they had not been effectively repre-
sented.99 Because this court recognized that the attorney had made
a tactical decision and had not deliberately misrepresented the peti-
tioners, the court denied the petitioners' motions to reopen, but
confirmed that ineffective counsel may have demanded a different
result. 100 These cases illustrate that courts may be willing to accept
arguments for appointing counsel to indigent immigrants in certain
circumstances, where there is a likelihood of prejudice against im-
migrants that leads to ineffective representation. In extending this
logic to children, there is an extremely compelling argument to be
made that children are almost always prejudiced by lack of coun-
sel. 10' Children's inherent vulnerability supports this suggestion:
The very characteristics that are frequently held to di-
minish children's legal rights indicate that children can-
not present their own court cases and therefore ought
to have a special claim to appointed counsel. These
characteristics establish that, in most instances, minors
lack the ability to gather facts and deal with issues,
handle their cases, understand legal issues, or conduct
cross-examinations without guidance from an attorney.
Youth itself may be regarded as 'a special factor' sug-
98 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 292 (providing that the right to
counsel in removal proceedings does not encompass the right to counsel at the
government's expense). But see Escobar-Ruiz, 787 F. 2d at 1297 n.3 (noting that
§ 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act may not be Constitutional in particu-
lar circumstances and that despite the prohibition against appointed counsel in
immigration proceedings, "due process could be held to require that an indigent
alien be provided with counsel").
99 See Magallanes-Damian, 783 F. 2d at 932.
100 See id. at 933, 934.
101 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 3, ("If there is a strong argument for
asserting that the government may at times be required by the U.S. constitution to
provide legal counsel for indigent adult aliens in removal proceedings, the argu-
ment is still stronger as applied to unaccompanied minors.").
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gesting that the appointment of a lawyer will make a
just determination more likely. Youth is frequently a
form of judicial shorthand for characteristics that inter-
fere with the ability to prosecute a claim.10 2
A close analysis of the law reveals that an indigent immigrant
child's right to appointed counsel is implicit in the right to due pro-
cess where juveniles meet "special circumstances" that have already
been recognized as demanding appointing counsel. 10 3 This right is
enumerated in legal precedent through the fifth amendment of the
Constitution and through a wealth of case law, entitling immigrants
to fair hearings.104 "Due process guarantees an alien the right to a
'full and fair' hearing, including a 'reasonable time to locate counsel
...and permit counsel to prepare for the hearing."'' 05 Unfortu-
nately, the nature of a deportation proceeding in itself seems to de-
prive immigrants of this opportunity for a fair hearing,10 6 where
those who are poor and barely able to articulate themselves in En-
glish depend on a foreign adversarial system for relief.10 7 In consid-
eration of the harsh punishment that immigrants are faced with if
deported, the only insurance against violating the rights of immi-
grant children is affording them appointed counsel.' 08
102 Ross, supra note 62, at 1599.
103 See supra note 68.
104 See, e.g., Flores, 507 U.S. at 314 (1993) (holding an alien is entitled to due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment in deportation proceedings); Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (holding that aliens must be allowed a
fair opportunity to be heard and where an alien is entitled to a hearing, the hearing
must be a fair one); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (holding that all aliens,
including undocumented aliens, are entitled to protection from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
105 Taylor, supra note 22, at 1660.
106 See Robertson, supra note 23, at 1019 (depicting the atmosphere of a de-
portation hearing).
107 See id. at 1019 ("The deportation hearing is the only opportunity for aliens
to plead their cases to remain in this country. The adversarial setting of a deporta-
tion hearing forces aliens - who may lack English language skills and knowledge
of our culture and laws - to conduct the presentation in a trial-like atmosphere.
Added to this burden is the complex nature of our immigration law. The process
often fails to give aliens a fair opportunity to be heard.").
108 See Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F. 2d at 573 (DeMascio, J. dissenting) ("Be-
cause the consequences of a deportation proceeding parallels punishment for
crime, only a per se rule requiring appointment of counsel will assure a resident
alien due process of law").
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The provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act qualify-
ing an immigrant's right to counsel of his choice is paradoxical,
where courts have emphasized that the right to counsel of choice
should not be abstract. 10 9 Courts articulate the indispensability of
this right by ensuring that immigrants facing deportation receive a
genuine opportunity to obtain counsel.110 In Rios-Berrios v. INS,
the petitioner brought an appeal against INS for denying him the
opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice, after the judge failed to
inform the petitioner of his right to counsel and failed to provide
the petitioner with a list of free legal services. 111 The Board of Im-
migration Appeals ("BIA") recognized that the trial judge abused
his discretion where the continuances granted to the petitioner to
locate counsel amounted to two working days.1 2 In Colindres-
Aguilar v. INS, the petitioner filed an appeal to the BIA, arguing
that he was deprived of his right to counsel after the immigration
judge failed to inquire whether or not the petitioner had waived his
right to counsel at his deportation hearing. 1 3 The BIA agreed with
the petitioner, finding that the immigration judge had an obligation
to inquire whether the petitioner had waived his right to counsel.' 14
Because the immigration judge did not so inquire, the BIA held
that the petitioner had been deprived a fair opportunity to obtain
counsel, in opposition to the statutory provision entitling the peti-
tioner to this right." 5 These decisions illustrate that even the BIA
recognizes the fundamental necessity of counsel at deportation
hearings.
109 See, e.g., Rios-Berrios, 776 F. 2d at 862 (indicating that a limitation on the
number of continuances an immigration judge is allowed to grant to ensure that
the alien has a fair opportunity to obtain counsel "makes a mockery of the clear
statutory mandate that a person in petitioner's position has the right to counsel of
his own choice"); Colindres-Aguilar v. INS, 819 F. 2d 259, 261 (1987) (finding that
an immigrant is entitled to an opportunity to obtain counsel, unless he expressly
waives such right).
110 See cases cited supra note 109.
111 See Rios-Berrios, 776 F. 2d at 860.
112 See id. at 862, 863 (finding the judge should have taken into consideration
the petitioner's circumstances before abusing the discretion inherent in his judicial
authority: "[t]he petitioner was in custody, spoke only Spanish, had limited educa-
tion, was unfamiliar with this country and its legal procedures, and had been re-
moved nearly 3,000 miles from his only friend in this country").
113 See Colindres-Aguilar, 819 F. 2d at 260, 261.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 260. 261.
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Another illustration of this notion that the right to counsel for
immigrants is so crucial that courts must ensure immigrants receive
a sincere opportunity to obtain counsel is Perez-Romero v. INS. 116
In Perez-Romero v. INS, the petitioner challenged his deportation
order, arguing that he had not been afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to obtain counsel. 117 The petitioner's deportation order was
eventually reversed, after a finding that the petitioner did not have
adequate opportunity to obtain counsel and therefore did not re-
ceive due process.118 These cases underscore that courts cannot de-
prive immigrants of a genuine opportunity to obtain counsel, and
courts cannot just interpret the statutory provision to be an abstract
interest.
"We [US Court of Appeals] have consistently emphasized the
critical role of counsel in deportation proceedings. We have charac-
terized an alien's right to counsel of choice as 'fundamental' and
have warned the INS not to treat it casually. As we have also said,
the right must be respected in substance as well as in name." 119 De-
spite this declaration that immigrants are entitled to choice of coun-
sel, this right remains theoretical because the majority of those
detained are poor individuals who usually do not obtain any coun-
sel, much less counsel of their choice. 120 "This qualified right
means very little to aliens who cannot afford a lawyer and are una-
ble to find a volunteer attorney. 1 21 Approximately 90% of de-
tained individuals are forced to argue pro se.1 22 While there is little
empirical data reporting how the intervention of counsel effects a
deportation hearing, it has been widely suggested that "[t]he inter-
vention of counsel seems likely to increase an alien's chances of
prevailing against the INS. '123
116 Perez-Romero v. INS, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19677 (9th Cir. 1991).
117 See id. at 6.
118 See id. at 10 (holding that the immigration judge abused his discretion by
failing to provide the petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel).
119 Baires v. INS, 856 F. 2d 89, 91 n.2 (9 th Cir. 1988) (holding that immigration
judge who denied alien continuance of asylum hearing violated alien's statutory
and regulatory procedural rights because alien did not have enough time to retain
counsel and communicate with counsel).
120 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1665 n.60 (reporting the results from a study
by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). The study revealed that
only 10.7% of individuals detained in INS custody received legal representation in
1996 and in 1995, 90.5% of detainees argued against their deiortation pro se).
121 Id.
122 See text accompanying supra note 120.
123 Taylor, supra note 22, at 1665.
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It is clear that attorneys affect the outcomes of deportation
proceedings. 124 Statistics from the Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review ("EOIR") also convey that the assistance of counsel
significantly increases the likelihood that an immigrant will win his
claim.125 These statistics confirm that the only assurance for a fair
hearing is government appointed counsel for immigrant children. 126
The government does not have a strong interest in denying im-
migrant children the right to appointed counsel in deportation hear-
ings. The government may claim that establishing such provisions
for children in custody would heighten administrative burdens and
increase fiscal burdens. This argument fails however, in light of the
benefits that appointed counsel for immigrant children stands to of-
fer, actually increasing administration of deportation hearings. 127
Even where administrative or economic efficiency is threatened, the
risk of the deprivation entailed in children's deportation hearings
demands the additional safeguard of having an attorneys present
with them throughout the hearing. The government's interest in
saving money does not outweigh the private interest of immigrant
children who do not have an opportunity to be heard when facing
deportation without counsel.
Section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, when ap-
plied to indigent children, is unconstitutional because the statute
denies due process to children by denying them appointed coun-
sel.128 Even where the government cannot guarantee indigent im-
migrant children the right to remain in the United States, it can and
should provide them with a fair opportunity to be heard. This pro-
124 See id. at 1666 ("Despite the present dearth of empirical evidence, how-
ever, there can be no doubt that attorneys influence the outcome of removal pro-
ceedings, especially in circumstances where an alien has a viable ground to contest
deportation or is eligible for some form of relief.").
125 See id. at 1665 n.62 ("EOIR statistics of custody and representation status
generally indicate a higher instance of favorable outcomes for aliens who are rep-
resented by counsel.").
126 See id. at 1666 n.4 (The importance of counsel to represent the alien in
some cases cannot be overemphasized. No doubt they make the work of the INS
officers more difficult. Yet from this very difficulty comes the necessity for more
care in the preparation of the case and more painstaking deliberation about it. The
presence of counsel makes it less likely that a case will run along in a routine
manner to a decision to expel, with important witnesses overlooked and not ques-
tioned, to be followed by frantic eleventh-hour presentation of new evidence
which gives the case an entirely different appearance.").
127 See discussion infra Part IV.
128 See case cited supra note 108.
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tection should be secured by appointing counsel for immigrant chil-
dren who cannot afford counsel of their choice.
III. THE LAW SHOULD PROTECT CHILDREN BECAUSE OF THEIR
INTRINSIC VULNERABILITY
"Children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect."'1 29 This recognition that children are "special" further dis-
tinguishes them from adults. The distinction between children and
adults should reinforce the government's obligation to afford chil-
dren the extra protection necessary to preserve their due process
rights. 130 There is no dispute that due process protection extends to
children. 3 1 The United States Supreme Court has clearly estab-
lished that "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,"
confirming that children are encompassed in the protections af-
forded by the Constitution. 132 In In re Gault, a 15-year-old peti-
tioner challenged a decision committing him to the State Industrial
School following a finding by the court that petitioner should be
classified as "delinquent," under the Arizona Juvenile Code. 133 The
petitioner brought his challenge asserting that Arizona's Juvenile
Code is unconstitutional because it does not provide procedural
due process rights to children categorized as delinquent.134
The Court in Gault discussed the reasoning behind the classifi-
cation of juvenile proceedings as civil, indicating that the lack of
procedural rules for children had been intended to promote more
discretion for judges presiding over these hearings and ultimately,
more empathetic and individualized care of juveniles. 135 Gault also
recognized that this classification of juvenile proceedings did not
always produce the fair decisions that had initially moved the legal
129 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion).
130 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 18 n. 38 ("Congress, too, has
shown a long-standing concern for the vulnerability of children caught up in the
legal system.").
131 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); See also Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of ma-
jority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights.").
132 Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
133 Id. at 4.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 17.
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system in this direction. Instead, irregular procedural rules in juve-
nile proceedings promoted arbitrariness and not a more compas-
sionate form of due process.136 This recognition is especially
significant when applied to immigration proceedings; although clas-
sified as civil, deportation hearings involve the loss of such a sub-
stantial interest for immigrants facing deportation that it is crucial
to extend certain procedural safeguards for the protection of these
interests.137
Emphasizing that due process is indispensable to children, the
Court in Gault held that children in juvenile proceedings are enti-
tled to due process protection.1 38 Gault also recognized that such
protection may require the appointment of counsel in juvenile pro-
ceedings and extended this right to children in such proceedings,
articulating that legal representation is essential to a child's right to
a fair hearing. 139 "The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether
he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. ' ' 14° Gault estab-
lished the right to appointed counsel for juveniles in delinquency
proceedings despite the classification of such proceedings as civil
because the Court recognized that children, entitled to due process,
were also entitled to counsel. 41 Similar to.the juvenile proceedings
that the Court in Gault recognized as threatening to the rights of
children, deportation, while defined as civil, poses a comparably se-
rious threat to the rights of those detained.142
136 See id. at 18, 19.
137 See Aguilera, 516 F. 2d at 572 ("Expulsion is such lasting punishment that
meaningful due process can require no less. Assuredly, it inflicts punishment as
grave as the institutionalization which may follow an In re Gault finding of delin-
quency. A resident alien's right to due process should not be tempered by a classi-
fication of the deportation proceeding as 'civil', 'criminal', or 'administrative.' No
matter the classification, deportation is punishment, pure and simple.").
138 See Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
139 See id. at 36.
140 Id. at 36.
141 Id.
142 See Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting)
("Deportation is punishment. It involves first an arrest, a deprival of liberty; and,
second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from property... [Ilt
needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is pun-
ishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family,
and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land,
is punishment; and that oftentimes most severe and cruel"). See also Id. (Field, J.,
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Gault only furthers the notion that due process protection is
equated with having an attorney present, where children are in-
volved. 143 "[C]ounsel is often indispensable to a practical realiza-
tion of due process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned
determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition.' 144 Recog-
nizing that children need attorneys to articulate and assert their le-
gal claims, it is evident how crucial the presence of an attorney is
for immigrant children who typically are not able to speak English,
much less able to make complex legal arguments in English. 145
Despite the recognition that children are entitled to due pro-
cess protection under the Constitution, children must not necessa-
rily be treated as adults.146 The practice in which the law applies to
minors, is highly distinguishable from its application to adults, to
account for children's vulnerability. 147 In Bellotti v. Baird, 148 the
Court made three justifications in concluding that the constitutional
rights of children are distinct from those of adults. 149 In holding
that a minor has the right to ask a court for permission to have an
abortion, without first asking her parents, the Court acknowledged
that children have a sufficient right to an opportunity to be heard,
without the interference of that right by a parent.15 0 The Court also
stressed that this right would be "unrealistic... [if it were assumed
that] the mere existence of a legal right to seek relief in superior
court provides an effective avenue of relief for some of those who
dissenting) ("The punishment [deportation] is beyond all reason in its severity. It
is out of all proportion to the alleged offence. It is cruel and unusual. As to its
cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one's resi-
dence, and the breaking up of all relations of friendship, family, and business there
contracted.").
143 See Gault, 387 at 40.
144 N.Y. Family Court Act § 241.
145 See supra text accompanying note 9.
146 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("Viewed together, our
cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitu-
tional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is enti-
tled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs
147 See id.
148 Id.
149 See Id. at 634 ("We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclu-
sion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical deci-
sions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing.").
150 See id. at 647.
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need it most. ''t 51 The Court in Bellotti recognized that children are
inherently different from adults and enumerated at least two spe-
cific qualities that illustrate this distinction including "the peculiar
vulnerability of children"'152 and "their inability to make critical de-
cisions in an informed, mature manner."' 53 The nature of these dis-
tinctions further corroborates that children are so intrinsically
subject to having their rights violated that they are especially in
need of a voice to communicate their legal claims to immigration
judges.154
Children are not only incapable of voicing their own defenses
to deportation because of the complexity of immigration law, but
are inhibited by the nature of their childhood. Bellotti's recognition
that the mere existence of a legal right does not ensure that the
right will be afforded is especially distressing when considering im-
migrant children left to argue against their own deportation, pro
se.155 Childhood, especially the formative years, symbolizes an un-
guarded time for children during which they often are unable to
fully articulate themselves.' 56 It is counterintuitive to allow any
child, arguably incapable of presenting a complex legal defense to
an immigration judge, to go forth without counsel because the child
faces a grave consequence, if ordered deported. Even more abusive
is allowing immigrant children to face deportation proceedings,
without appointed counsel.
The Supreme Court has consistently noted that the peculiar
vulnerabilities of children are significant legally and influence both
children's interests in liberty and their need for counsel.' 57 This
vulnerability manifests itself in special formalities established to as-
sert the rights of children.158 The United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child is one illustration of a formal written docu-
ment delineating the rights of children.' 59 Recognizing that chil-
151 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
152 Id at 634.
153 Id.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
155 See supra text accompanying note 55.
156 See Bellotti, 443 at 635 (describing a child's lack of capacity to avoid detri-
mental decisions to his well-being, during his formative years.).
157 See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. 1. See also Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622.
158 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, entered
into force 2 Sept. 1990, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 49), U.N.
Doc. A/44/49, at 166 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
159 See id. (enumerating the rights of children, under the convention).
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dren need special care and assistance, the convention emphasizes
that the immediate consideration regarding all actions related to
children compels those acting to consider the best interests of the
child.160 The convention specifically entitles a child's right to
prompt legal assistance where that child may be deprived of his life
or liberty.161
Under the Constitution, there is no question of right to due
process for indigent immigrant children. 162 The complexity of im-
migration law, already deemed too difficult for adults without a le-
gal background to dissect, should ensure that indigent immigrant
children receive appointed counsel to comport with their due pro-
cess rights. 163 The only conclusion that may be reached from this
certainty is that if the law is too complex for adults, it is only that
much more difficult for children because children are inherently
less capable of understanding legal principles. Immigration law "is
complex and intimidating, even to those who have legal counsel.
However, children displaced by wars in Central America are partic-
ularly vulnerable in the immigration labyrinth.1 64 The lack of ap-
pointed counsel for immigrant children is a deprivation of due
process, where their right to be heard is abstract, without the assis-
tance of a legal representative. 165
Courts have repeatedly recognized that the right to counsel
and fairness in deportation hearings is not an abstract right and
there should be real opportunities to obtain counsel.1 66 For indi-
gent immigrant children who are not granted counsel, this right
could not be more abstract because most of the children cannot af-
ford an attorney.1 67 Having recognized that children are fundamen-
tally different and more vulnerable than adults, a logical conclusion
160 See id.
161 See id. ("[Elvery child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to
prompt legal and other appropriate assistance.").
162 See cases cited supra note 104.
163 See Ross, supra note 62, at 1599 ("Above all, the practice of law may be
nearly unfathomable to the uninitiated . . . '[t]hat which is simple, orderly and
necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex
and mysterious' . . . If this observation is true for adults, it must be even more so
for children. When the uninitiated appear in court, the results are potentially
dangerous.").
164 Olivas, supra note 18, at 830.
165 See Rios Berrios, 776 F. 2d at 862 (emphasizing that the right to counsel in
a deportation hearing is explicit and should not be abstract).
166 See cases cited supra note 96.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 55, 66, 71.
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follows that the appointment of counsel is integral to due process
for children. This right must be extended to immigrant children
who are entitled to the same protections afforded all other chil-
dren. 168 "The very characteristics that are frequently held to dimin-
ish children's legal rights indicate that children cannot present their
own court cases and therefore ought to have a special claim to ap-
pointed counsel."'1 69
The Fifth Amendment provides immigrant children with a fun-
damental right in jurisprudence, guaranteeing due process.170 The
denial of access to government-funded attorneys by children in INS
detention presents a direct contradiction to the due process rights
meant to protect them. 17' "[T]he bundle of vulnerabilities bears
directly and affirmatively on children's need for appointed
counsel."1 72
IV. THE GOVERNMENT STANDS TO GAIN SUBSTANTIAL
BENEFITS IN PROVIDING DETAINED IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
WITH APPOINTED COUNSEL
The benefits derived by indigent children in INS custody, in
having counsel appointed, extend to serve the government's inter-
ests as well. Our legal system prides itself on allowing parties in
litigation a fair opportunity to vigilantly represent themselves in
court. The virtue this adversarial system lacks credibility however
when one of the parties is a lay person, particularly a child, virtually
speechless due to a lack of experience and, in the case of most im-
migrants, a lack of ability to speak English. The government can
preserve the notion that our judicial system affords all parties fair-
ness by ensuring that an immigrant child's day in court is marked by
a genuine effort at representing the child's interest to the best ex-
tent possible.' 73
168 See Sarah Harton Clark, Note: Substantive Due Process in a State of Flux:
Should Courts Develop New Fundamental Rights for Alien Children?, 72 B.U.L.
REV. 579, 599 (1992) ("[A]lien children should possess the same fundamental
rights as those generally enjoyed by all children. Fundamental rights should not be
restricted based on the children's potential illegal status, a status over which they
usually have no control.").
169 Ross, supra note 62, at 1599.
170 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
171 See supra text accompanying note 7.
172 Ross, supra note 62, at 1594.
173 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1667 ("In short, the presence of lawyers on
both sides of adversarial removal proceedings protects the integrity of the immi-
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In a more pragmatic sense, the single largest benefit that the
government stands to gain from extending appointed counsel to im-
migrant children is increased efficiency in the administration of im-
migration laws.174 While it appears that providing appointed
counsel for children in INS custody would be more expensive for
the government, a closer analysis of the long-term benefits of this
remedy proves otherwise. 175 In reality, appointing counsel for indi-
gent immigrants would alleviate many of the expenses presently in-
curred by the government, as a result of slow and inefficient
handling of current immigration hearings, due to a lack of counsel
on both sides.176 Attorneys would be especially useful to immigra-
tion judges, where attorneys could articulate legal claims better
than lay people, saving the court the time it takes to decipher such
claims from those arguing pro se. 177
In addition to more orderly hearings, the governments inter-
ests would be served in spending less money to keep individuals in
detention, where providing attorneys would eliminate an immi-
grant's need to ask for continuances to secure legal representa-
tion.1 78 The faster the INS could hear each immigration case, the
faster it would be able to either release or remove the immigrant,
saving the cost of detaining individuals for extended periods of
time.
gration adjudication system, helps to ensure just results, and guards against later
reversals of incorrect decision").
174 See Robertson supra note 23, at 1034 ("The government's interest [in ap-
pointing counsel at deportation hearings] involves the efficient administration of
the immigration laws.").
175 See id at 1036 ("[T]he cost to the government [in providing appointed
counsel in deportation hearings] might not be as great as it seems.").
176 See id. at 1036 (suggesting the appearance of counsel may decrease the
reversible errors that occur during immigration hearings and in effect, lower the
number of uneconomical appeals that result from an alien's lack of
representation).
177 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1666 ("Attorneys can systematically organize
the presentation of the case, to the benefit of the presiding officer. They focus
attention on critical legal issues, such as questions of statutory interpretation ....
The importance of lawyers is underscored by the INS's practice of assigning a trial
attorney to appear in every contested removal proceeding.").
178 See Robertson, supra note 23, at 1.036 ("[Tjhe INS detains many aliens
from the time it issues them an order to show cause until the end of a deportation
hearing. Providing counsel could reduce the detention time because an alien
would not need to ask for continuances to obtain an attorney.").
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Some non-governmental organizations around the United
States have already taken the initiative to implement programs to
promote the representation of indigent immigrants, serving those
detained directly, and the government indirectly.179 One program,
illustrating a highly efficient methodology in implementing such a
model is the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project ("Flo-
rence Project."). 18° The model used by the Florence Project begins
with a rights presentation for groups of detained individuals at the
Florence Arizona, Service Processing Center. This presentation
usually occurs before the detained individuals are scheduled to ap-
pear for their first hearing in immigration court. 81 Following this
initial presentation in both English and Spanish, the staff of the Flo-
rence Project meets personally with those who decide to challenge
their deportation. 182
Even in this preliminary aspect of providing detained individu-
als with information regarding their rights, the government may im-
mediately benefit, where those who realize that they do not have
any relief from removal can choose to accept voluntary depar-
ture, 183 saving the government the time and cost of continuing with
additional hearings. 84 The combination of services rendered by the
Florence Project evidence the tremendous potential for increased
efficiency in the immigration process where attorneys are repre-
senting indigent immigrants.
179 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1694, 1696 (describing how programs such as
the "South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Representation Project" and the "Florence
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project" provide both an increase in the possibility
of representation for detained individuals and important legal information to those
detained).
180 The Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project is a non-profit organ-
ization that provides free legal services to individuals in INS detention, in rural
Florence, Arizona.
181 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1696 (detailing the process of the Florence
Project's model).
182 See id. at 1697.
183 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240 B (a) (1) ("The Attorney Gen-
eral may permit an alien to depart the United States at the alien's own expense
under this subsection, in lieu of being subject to proceedings under section 240 or
prior to the completion of such proceedings, if the alien is not deportable under
section 237 (a) (2) (A) (iii) or section 237 (a) (4) (B)").
184 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1697 ("A brief consultation with a represen-
tative from the Florence Project convinces some detainees to accept immediate
deportation, rather than waiting weeks or months to hear an immigration judge
reach the same conclusion.").
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Group right orientations promote expeditious master
calendar hearings. 18 5 An effective pro bono referral
system can reduce the number of continuances granted
to enable unrepresented aliens to find an attorney.
Moreover, providing accurate information early on in
the process may help reduce detention stays for those
with no viable argument against their impending
removal. 186
In addition to the rights presentation and individual counsel-
ing, the Florence Project furnishes detained individuals with written
information intended to equip them with a better understanding of
the immigration process and of their own individual situations.187
The staff attorneys of the Florence Project provide direct represen-
tation for those with the most hopeful claims.' 88 This model dem-
onstrates that it is possible to provide immigrants with a real
opportunity to be heard, and not the abstract right provided by the
Immigration and Nationality Act,189 while at the same time, serving
the government's interests.190 Because serving the interests of de-
tained immigrants' and the government's interests simultaneously
are not mutually exclusive, it follows that the government would be
sensible to further consider the implementation of appointed coun-
sel for children in INS custody.
This type of model would serve both indigent children in INS
custody and the government and could be implemented through
screening procedures to identify those children who have a statu-
tory remedy against deportation. 191 Courts have already recog-
185 Master calendar hearings refer to the various individual hearings through-
out the entire removal proceeding.
186 Taylor, supra note 22, at 1697.
187 See id. at 1697 ("The Florence Project provides detained aliens with writ-
ten materials explaining possible avenues of relief, offers 'a frank evaluation of the
strength of their cases,' and assists those who are interviewed with bond
representation").
188 See id. at 1697 (describing the process of selection for those who will be
represented).
189 See supra note 69, and accompanying text.
190 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1697 ("Proponents of the Florence 'Justice
and Efficiency' Model (a name deliberately chosen to broaden the project's ap-
peal) emphasize that this 'triage' system meets detained aliens' critical need for
legal help while also serving the government's interests.").
191 See Robertson, supra note 23, at 1037 (proposing that a claims based
model would reveal which aliens would be most prejudiced from a lack of
counsel).
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nized that a determination of prejudice may in some cases, create
the right to appointed counsel, to ensure that due process rights are
not violated. 192 A claims-based model could efficiently determine
which cases are most susceptible to this prejudice by recognizing
those with the most favorable claims who would otherwise be lost
in the system. 193 One pattern reveals that those children who have
existing statutory claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act
are the children who are most likely to suffer prejudice from lack of
counsel. These children have arguments to make but remain voice-
less in making them without attorneys. 94
A claims-based model is a pragmatic solution "[b]ecause the
determination of statutory eligibility sometimes depends on gather-
ing a complex set of facts, [and] the IJ [immigration judge] cannot
always know at the beginning of the hearing whether an alien is
able to make a claim for relief."'1 95 The presumption by an immi-
gration judge of a valid claim would depend on the presence of cer-
tain statutory eligibility requirements, easily apparent to an
attorney. 96 The presence of such criteria, in combination with each
child's individual case would provide a good basis for determining
who stands to suffer prejudice from a lack of counsel and would
provide a good standard for appointing counsel to those who are
identified in this category. 197
This model would serve the government's interests because at-
torneys could effectively present the arguments of those with color-
able claims to relief, saving the government the time and money
involved in delegating the responsibility of deciphering the nuances
of each particular child's claim to the immigration judge.' 98 Effec-
tive presentations by attorneys, in contrast to the immigration judge
192 See cases cited supra note 97.
193 See id.
194 See Robertson, supra note 23, at 1037 (indicating that the cases where
courts have found prejudice, the aliens have had some statutory basis for relief).
195 Taylor, supra note 22, at 1038.
196 See id. at 1038 ("As long as the alien is not ineligible due to specific statu-
tory criteria, the IJ could presume a valid claim exists").
197 See id. at 1038 ("[T]he posture of the alien's case-in relation to the avail-
able statutory relief-has usually determined whether the lack of counsel would
have been prejudicial. This distinction can provide a model for determining an
alien's right to counsel.").
198 See Robertson, supra note 23, at 1037 ("The reviewing courts realized that
attorneys could have aided these aliens [those with statutory claims for relief] in
presenting their cases before the U.").
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having to scrutinize each individual case, could considerably de-
crease the time spent by immigration judges who have several roles
during an immigration proceeding. 199 Because immigration judges
play multiple roles during an immigration proceeding, the assis-
tance of counsel could alleviate some of the judge's duties, allowing
for more expeditious proceedings. 200
While the government has not yet reserved funding for models
that assist aliens in securing legal representation, certainly it has
recognized the need for more efficiency and cost-saving measures in
immigration hearings, evidenced primarily in a Senate resolution. 201
The resolution, proposing government funding for obtaining legal
assistance for detained aliens, indicates that even the government
acknowledges the benefits it stands to gain from implementing ap-
pointed counsel for immigrants.20 2 The government should strive to
implement programs appointing counsel for immigrant children out
of fairness 203 and not out of a desire to expedite the removal of
indigent immigrants more rapidly. Regardless of the motive how-
ever, it is clear that the government has strong interests in ap-
pointing counsel to children in deportation proceedings. 204
199 See CONSTANCE T. O'BRYANT, THE SELF-REPRESENTED IN THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE TRIBUNAL: ISSUES CONFRONTED, PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED & SOLU-
TIONS OFFERED 2 (unpublished) (on file with the NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS) (depicting the role of an administrative law judge as
"wearing three hats," contributing to the awkward and often difficult position to
which an immigration judge is subject).
200 See id. at 4 ("Many matters that are, hopefully, second nature to lawyers,
have to be explained (translated, if you will), for the pro se party .... [Slome
respondents are completely at a loss to know what to do. They lack knowledge of
what's relevant to the proceeding and what is not ... . They tend to ramble, going
on and on, generally making points tha have no merit .... Then there is the other
type of pro se party who mistakenly believes that he/she knows what to do, but
their 'little bit of knowledge' only adds to the difficulty the judge will experience in
the case.").
201 See S. Res. 284, 1 03r" Cong. (1994).
202 See S. Res. 284 ("[tlhe Attorney General should consider implementing,
through awarding start-up administrative grants to appropriate not-for-profit orga-
nizations, a pilot program at processing centers of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service for the purpose of increasing efficiency and cost savings in the
processing and removal of aliens held in custody by assuring orientation and repre-
sentation for such aliens... ").
203 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 1710 ("Policy makers and immigration offi-
cials should also recognize procedural fairness and just results as important
goals.").
204 See id. at 1708 (suggesting that even those who are not concerned with
providing immigrants with fundamental fairness, may be concerned with saving
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CONCLUSION
Children, unlike adults, do not always have the freedom to
make their own choices. For immigrant children, this lack of free-
dom to choose, should not justify their punishment, where many of
the children who end up in INS detention may not have even cho-
sen to come to this country. Since they do end up in the United
States for a multitude of reasons, however,20 5 children are entitled
to the protection of our government.
Sound reasoning cannot contradict that deportation is a drastic
form of castigation. Most daunting is that this seemingly primitive
measure is being used by the United States government in 1999, to
banish people into exile, sometimes back to countries where these
individuals will face persecution.20 6 Even more appalling still is the
nightmarish image of children, helpless and filled with fear, being
shipped back to war-plagued countries, without ever having re-
ceived a fair hearing.
Depriving indigent children of appointed counsel in immigra-
tion detention effectuates a deprivation of a constitutional right,
where the lack of legal representation for a child is equivalent to
the lack of a right to a fair hearing. Children who do not have
counsel do not have a legal voice. If the government takes this
voice away from children, they are denied fundamental fairness be-
cause they do not get the opportunity to be heard, entitled to them
under due process.207
Obtaining counsel for children in deportation proceedings is
the only way to ensure that these children are protected and are
afforded the due process rights to which they are entitled. The only
solution that will ensure justice for indigent immigrant children in
detention is a provision giving them voice by appointing counsel for
those facing deportation hearings.
Sharon Finkel
time and money, through promotion of legal representation for INS detainees,
funded by the government).
205 See Ehrenreich, supra note 36, at 279, 280 (discussing the various reasons
that draw immigrant children to the United States and how many of the children
unknowingly end up in precarious conditions once here, such as prostitution smug-
gling rings, after fleeing their mother countries).
206 See supra text accompanying note 55.
207 See cases cited supra note 76.
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